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RESUMO - This study assessed the influence of Stereotypes about Parliamentarians and Behavioral Contagion on Political 
Participation, comparing two countries: Brazil and Sweden. Stereotypes were admitted to be useful to tell parliamentarians’ 
groups apart and predict their behavior. Behavioral Contagion was investigated as a possible catalyst of political action. Online 
questionnaires were administered to 984 Brazilians (37.4% women) and 879 Swedes (46.5% women). Structural Equation 
Modeling assessed relationships among variables. Behavioral Contagion played a pivotal role on predicting political engagement. 
Stereotypes predicted participation where they challenged commonsense: Brazilians usually cannot tell the difference among 
politicians, then those Brazilians who could were more politically engaged; in Sweden, the factor “corruption” predicts non-
institutional types of Participation. 
Keywords: Political Participation, Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, Behavioral Contagion
Participação Política no Brasil e na Suécia: o papel dos estereótipos e do contágio
ABSTRACT - Este estudo investigou a influência de estereótipos sobre parlamentares e contágio comportamental na 
participação política, comparando dois países: Brasil e Suécia. Considerou-se que estereótipos podem ser úteis para diferenciar 
grupos de parlamentares e predizer seus comportamentos. O Contágio Comportamental foi investigado como um possível 
catalisador da ação política. Os questionários online foram respondidos por 984 brasileiros (37,4% mulheres) e 879 suecos 
(46,5% mulheres). Empregou-se a Modelagem por Equações Estruturais para aferir as relações entre as variáveis. O Contágio 
Comportamental foi central na predição do engajamento. Os estereótipos predisseram participação quando desafiavam o senso 
comum: brasileiros não costumam diferenciar parlamentares, mas aqueles que conseguiam eram mais engajados; na Suécia, 
o fator “corrupção” predisse a participação não-institucional.
Palavras-chave: participação política, estereótipos sobre parlamentares, contágio comportamental
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How do individuals make decisions about political 
participation in the real context, in their everyday lives, 
based on the straggling information they have about par-
liamentarians? Some psychological processes could help 
summarize a large amount of information and political 
influences received by a given individual. However, such 
processes might be relatively stable inside one country, as 
citizens are subject to the same context and culture. Com-
paring contrasting countries may unfold to which extent 
those processes truly influence participation, avoiding 
context-specific interpretations (Teorell, 2006). 
This study’s general objective is to compare the influen-
ce of Stereotypes about Parliamentarians and Behavioral 
Contagion on Political Participation between two contras-
ting countries (Brazil and Sweden). It is hypothesized that 
Political Participation can be predicted by Stereotypes about 
Parliamentarians and Behavioral Contagion. 
Brazil and Sweden were selected for such compari-
son for their reported contrasts on culture and political 
behavior. Swedes do not accept power distance from their 
representatives, while in Brazil this might be considered 
“natural”. Swedes’ preference for equality and individual 
sovereignty requires citizens (including politicians) to 
be self-sufficient and respect general rules. Brazilians do 
not trust “people outside family”, and do not feel obliga-
tions to larger groups such as neighbors, fellow citizens, 
or nation (Realo, Allik & Greenfield, 2008; Triandis & 
Gelfand, 1998).
These differences are reflected in political life. Re-
garding trust in the political system, Brazilians complain 
about the malfunctioning of governmental institutions and 
the impunity of bad politicians (Moisés & Carneiro, 2008). 
Moreover, Brazilian politics is marked by ‘generalized’ 
corruption, and it is hard to uphold the existence of ‘good 
politicians’ (Cunha, 2006). Swedes, in turn, highly trust 
their system, which enabled a Welfare State that promotes 
social equality and experiences low corruption (Kumlin 
& Rothstein, 2005; Marien & Hooghe, 2011; Rothstein & 
Uslaner, 2005). Both countries have recently faced strong 
popular mobilization. For example, since 2011 Brazilians 
have been taking the streets to protest against political cor-
ruption, with massive protests in June 2013, followed by 
other important protests up to 2016. In Sweden, protesters 
have been fighting primarily over issues like the conditions 
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of African and Arabian refugees, especially after riots burst 
on immigrant neighborhoods of Stockholm in May 2013. If 
results in this study are found to be valid to such contras-
ting cases, the concepts employed herein can be useful to 
investigate other countries.
Political Participation. The theoretical perspectives on 
political participation started by focusing exclusively on 
the citizen’s act of selecting the political elite members, 
as if citizens should be active only during elections (Dahl, 
1956; Downs, 1957; Schumpeter, 1942). The attention for 
political behaviors not exclusively related to elections 
was fostered after the publication of works by Almond 
and Verba (1963, 1980), Milbrath (1965), Verba and Nie 
(1972), and Kaase and Marsh (1979). Along the last 50 
years new behaviors were investigated as exemplary po-
litical engagement (Teorell, 2006). 
Engagement in community actions, political consu-
merism, participation in organized social movements, 
participation in protests, organization of petitions or even 
getting involved in acts of political violence could also be 
considered to be forms of political participation (Brussino, 
Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008; Dalton, 2008; Lake & Huckfeldt, 
1998; Stolle, Hooghe & Micheletti, 2005). The inclusion 
of these new behaviors expanded the concept of political 
participation.
 Ekman and Amnå’s (2012) framework is the basis 
for this study’s approach on Political Participation. They 
proposed a framework intended to organize such diversity 
of behaviors into categories. They have built a spectrum 
that starts with Non-participation (antipolitical and apo-
litical attitudes), through Latent Participation (Attention 
and Action), and ends with Manifest Participation (Formal 
Participation, Legal and Illegal activism). For Ekman and 
Amnå (2012),  non-participation or disengagement could 
be respectively characterized in terms of anti-political 
or apolitical attitudes. Anti-political attitudes are linked 
to active forms of disengagement (like manifesting their 
displeasure about politics or having an anti-political 
lifestyle), while apolitical attitudes are linked to passive 
forms, such as perceiving politics as something humdrum. 
The latent forms of participation comprise attention to 
politics and “Civic Engagement” (actions that produce 
political impact external to the context of governmental 
institutions, like voluntary social works). These authors 
state that latent forms of participation were neglected by 
studies in the field; moreover, they discuss if attentive 
citizens get into action when actually needed (Amnå & 
Ekman, 2014).  
Manifest types of Political Participation comprise 
participation in the formal political system (actions which 
comply with the rules of political institutions) and the 
extra-parliamentarian participation, which was divided into 
legal and illegal forms of action (Ekman & Amnå, 2012). 
This could become a serious obstacle for cross-country 
comparisons, as what is legal in one country can be illegal 
in another, or even legality boundaries can change on the 
same country, through time. Hence, instead of classifying 
activism in terms of legality or illegality, it is proposed to 
differentiate violent and non-violent acts. The behaviors 
classified by Ekman and Amnå (2012) remain unchanged, 
but the item ‘Civil Disobedience’ was moved to the “non-
-violent” group. At last, the framework allows the evalua-
tion of several types of Political Participation, which suits 
this study’s main objective.
Stereotypes about Parliamentarians. Every day, citi-
zens are exposed to an avalanche of political information. 
Newspapers, TV, radio, social media, blogs, websites, chats 
in bars etc. A wide range of information could be used to 
understand the interaction of groups in the parliamentarian 
arena: parties, interests of the sectors they represent, profes-
sion (previous to that as parliamentarian), political offices 
previously held, etc. (Carlin & Love, 2013; Druckman, 
2001; Garzia, 2013; Kam, 2007; Koch, 2003). However, 
politically lay citizens may ignore several pieces of infor-
mation and base their opinions on what they consider to be 
more relevant (Arceneaux, 2008; Druckman, 2001, Lau & 
Redlawsk, 2001).
This study assumes that stereotypes can summarize a 
large amount of information about a group (Jussim, Mc-
Cauley & Lee, 1995; Mackie, 1973; Ryan, 2003). Regar-
ding politics, stereotypes can be especially useful to help 
lay citizens to differentiate members of political parties or 
those who represent some specific sector of society (Has-
lam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Reynolds, 1997; Koch, 
2003; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Schneider & Bos, 2011). 
Based on relevant information, citizens can try to predict 
the behavior of parliamentarians (Arceneaux, 2008; Carlin 
& Love, 2013; Samuels & Zucco, 2013). Moreover, this 
study tests if citizens may choose their form of political 
participation based on how they perceive the behavior of 
parliamentarians (Kinder & Sears, 1985; Sacchi, Carnaghi, 
Castellini & Colombo, 2013).
On one hand, the present study evaluates citizens’ 
perception on how critical some pieces of information 
might be – henceforth, this dimension of stereotypes about 
parliamentarians will be named “Critical Information”. On 
the other hand, this study assesses citizens’ expectations 
upon the parliamentarians – henceforth, this dimension 
of stereotypes about parliamentarians will be named 
“Behavior Prediction”.
Stereotype-based classification can be useful to un-
derstand the parliamentarian politics. People capable of 
identifying the difference between parties can recog-
nize, with higher probability of success, stereotypic or 
counter-stereotypic behaviors of politicians (Carlin & 
Love, 2013; Koch, 2003; Samuels & Zucco, 2013). In 
other words, if a left-wing Socialist candidate employs 
arguments that do not fit in his/her stereotype (e.g., 
advocating non-intervention of the State on economy), 
electors recognize the disparity and point out that ‘there is 
something wrong’ in that speech (Kinder & Sears, 1985; 
Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Sacchi et al., 2013). This study 
intends to assess the association between the citizens’ 
attention to such information and a higher or lower degree 
of political engagement.
Behavioral Contagion. The classic work of Gustave 
Le Bon (1896), The Crowd: a study of the popular mind is 
considered an important milestone in the understanding of 
collective action. Though criticized for his anti-democratic 
bias, the issues raised by Le Bon fostered scientific debates 
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along the 20th century (McGuire, 1987; Moscovici, 1985). 
Le Bon argues that crowds are assembled as they bear three 
characteristics: suggestibility, feeling of invincible power and 
contagion. The author states that crowds become irrespon-
sible for their actions and that individuals in a crowd act as 
they were hypnotized, guided by the collective will. 
Some researchers followed Le Bon’s (1896) aristocratic 
ideas, while others tried to provide ‘neutrality’ to his analysis 
(McGuire, 1987; Nye, 1973). Social psychology studies have 
mostly found evidence that individuals tend to adjust their 
behaviors according to the surrounding crowd, with little self-
-criticism. Some post-1950 theories (as organized by Jesus, 
2013) reach similar conclusions: theory of deindividuation 
(e.g. Diener, 1980); theory of social identity (e.g. Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979); theory of convergence (based on Festinger’s, 
1975, theory of cognitive dissonance); and emerging norms 
model (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004).
The concept of contagion provides especially relevant 
insights to the investigation of political participation. It is 
indeed worth questioning if there is a multiplying effect that 
could increase the chances of an individual to participate in 
a collective action – even if by imitation of friends or other 
close persons. 
Empirical evidences of the implication of contagion on 
political participation were found (e.g., Cho & Rudolph, 
2008; Harrigan, Achananuparp & Lim, 2012; McClurg, 
2003; McFarland & Thomas; 2006). Contrary to the idea of 
unconscious group behavior, Gomes and Maheirie (2010) 
point out that collectively organized political participa-
tion has impact on the psychological constitution of the 
individual; the authors highlight that individuals assign 
conscious meaning to what they do as member of the group 
(corroborated by McClurg, 2003). This research intends to 
assess the influence of Behavioral Contagion on Political 
Participation, adding empirical evidence to this debate on 
the literature.
The set of independent variables tested herein is innova-
tive; as such, empirical support is needed to state whether 
they can or cannot predict Political Participation. The social 
relevance of such an investigation is the assessment of the 
effect of Stereotypes about Parliamentarians and Behavioral 
Contagion on Political Participation, in order to explain and 
help encouraging the increase of political action.
Method
Instruments 
Instruments in this study were elaborated with the co-
-operation of 21 specialists in Brazil and in Sweden in a 
Delphic Panel procedure (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). This 
ensured that the items would not be based on one culture 
and forced onto another, as specialists from both countries 
worked in sync. The resulting questionnaire, originally 
in English, underwent back-translation (to Brazilian Por-
tuguese and to Swedish) in repeated rounds, until judges 
reached enough agreement. This procedure reduced as much 
as possible the effect of translation over the participants’ 
interpretation of items. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
disclosed the factor structure used herein and Confirmatory 
Factor Analyses (CFA) indicated Factor Structure and 
Metric Equivalences between Brazil and Sweden. Internal 
consistency of Factors, assessed with Jöreskog’s Rho, ran-
ged from 0.60 to 0.90, and some items were assessed as 
standalones (where mentioned below).
After CFA, the factor structure represented this study’s 
variables as follows: 
a) Political Participation: Political Disillusion (3 items), 
Pre-Political Engagement (2 items); Institutional Par-
ticipation became a second-order factor, comprising 
Attention (4 items) and Action (5 items) – which diffe-
red from Ekman and Amnå’s (2012) framework. Three 
items remained as standalones (they did not fit in any 
factor): Political Consumerism; Street Demonstrations 
and Political Violence Legitimation.
b) Stereotypes about Parliamentarians: “Critical In-
formation” was organized in a second-order factor, 
comprising Party-Oriented View (3 items); Represen-
tation Trends (4 items) and Personal Information (2 
items) – these factors assessed how much attention 
citizens pay to these types of information. Other items 
were organized in two “Behavior Prediction” factors: 
Corruption (2 items) and Quality of Representation 
(5 items) – which assessed citizens’ expectations 
about politicians.
c) Behavioral Contagion: This became a single-factor 
variable, with 4 items encompassing behaviors of in-
fluencing other people and being influenced by others 
to engage political action. 
d) Demographics: Gender, Age, Educational Achie-
vement (highest educational grade obtained), 
Political Orientation (Left-Right wings); Party 
Membership, Party Sympathy, Party Rejection and 
Wealth (computed according to the possession of 
economic goods, such as TV, computer, car, house, 
boat, etc.). Participants also declared, in a zero to 
ten scale, how much each educational context has 
contributed to their knowledge of politics: School 
(first and second grades); University, Family, Co-
workers, Friends; members of an association / trade 
union / party in which they are also members; and 
learning on their own.
Data Collection
Brazilian and Swedish versions of the questionnaire were 
inserted into web panel platforms (websites with data collec-
tion tools). Data collection occurred in the year 2014, between 
June 25 and August 31 in Brazil, and between August 05 and 
August 18 in Sweden. Informed consent emphasized that the 
participant’s privacy was preserved.
Participants
Under a tolerance threshold of up to 10% of missing 
answers, 984 Brazilians’ questionnaires were considered 
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valid for analysis. The mean age was 43.95 (SD = 15.64), and 
37.4% were women. Concerning educational level, 71.3% 
had completed University Education, from which 48.5% were 
post-graduated. Regarding Swedes, 879 participants were 
considered for analysis. Swedish participants were 49.57 
years old on average (SD = 16.64), and 46.5% were women. 
On education, 27.9% had completed University Education, 
from which 5.1% were post-graduated. 
Analyses
Multiple Imputation (Allison, 2003) was used to esti-
mate the missing data, especially because SEM is strictly 
missing-unfriendly. Independent samples t-test was con-
ducted to compare means between Brazil and Sweden. The 
effect of independent variables (Stereotypes, Behavioral 
Contagion and Demographics) on Political Participation 
(dependent variable) was tested through Stepwise Multiple 
Regression. Stepwise Multiple Regression models provi-
ded a first selection of independent variables and a first 
look on how they influenced political participation. Those 
models were reproduced in Structural Equation Models 
(SEM). SEM provided additional evaluation, as multiple 
instances of mediation among variables could be tested 
and models’ Goodness-of-Fit could be evaluated. The 
adopted acceptance criteria for SEM models were χ2/ d.f. 
between 1 and 5 (Roussel et al., 2002); RMSEA < 0.70; 
SRMR < 0.80; CFI > 0.92; TLI > 0.92; (Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, Black & Babin, 2009).
Models for Brazil and Sweden were created separately 
and compared. Data-driven exploration with different mo-
dels for each country can elucidate cultural differences - the 
variables that predict political participation in one country 
may not work on another. Concurrent models were built, so 
that the best Goodness-of-Fit could be met through elicitation 
of relationships (such as mediation) and iterative exclusion 
of multicolinear variables.
Results
Regarding average answers to the 0 to 10 scales for 
each factor, Political Disillusion is below the midpoint 
for both groups, but Brazilians (M = 3.19, SD = 2.75) are 
more disillusioned than Swedes (M = 2.60, SD = 2.23); 
t(1843.48) = 5.09, p < 0.001. Participants from Brazil 
(M = 1.90, SD = 3.07) engaged in street demonstrations 
more often than those from Sweden (M = 0.60, SD = 
1.95); t(1687.83) = 11.04, p < 0.001. Political violence 
legitimation was remarkably low in both countries, but it 
received greater support in Brazil (M = 1.49, SD = 2.85) 
than in Sweden (M = 0.75, SD = 1.90); t(1726.70) = 6.67, 
p < 0.001. 
Pre-Political Participation (volunteering for a non-
-governmental association, neighborhood or kids school, 
for example) was more frequent in Brazil (M = 4.22, SD 
= 3.63) than in Sweden (M = 2.45, SD = 3.19); t(1860.48) 
= 11.16, p < 0.001. Brazilians (M = 5.27, SD = 4.28) and 
Swedes (M = 4.98, SD = 4.43) do not differ on the en-
gagement on Political Consumerism; t(1821.52) = 1.41, 
p = 0.158. When it comes to Institutional Participation, 
as assessed by the homonym Second-Order Factor, Bra-
zilians (M = 3.11, SD = 2.29) are more often engaged 
then Swedes (M = 1.46, SD = 1.70); t(1799.64) = 17.79, 
p < 0.001. 
Regarding Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, there is no 
significant difference on the general attention Brazilians (M 
= 4.61, SD = 2.37) and Swedes (M = 4.59, 2.69) pay to the 
Critical Information, t(1861.59) = 0.17, p = 0.866. Quality 
of Representation is close to the mid-point of the scale in 
Sweden (M = 4.68, SD = 1.77), which is significantly higher 
than the low quality perceived by Brazilians (M = 2.02, SD 
= 1.36); t(1642.36) = 36.05, p < 0.001. Corruption, on the 
other hand, is perceived as higher in Brazil (M = 7.41, SD 
= 2.24) than in Sweden (M = 4.08, SD = 2.62); t(1737.21) 
= 29.22, p < 0.001.
These results present a first overview on political action 
differences between Brazil and Sweden. The understanding 
of the relationships among these variables, provided by Struc-
tural Equation Modeling, is crucial to the comprehension of 
their systemic functioning in both countries.
Structural Equation Models for the present study achieved 
adequate Goodness-of-Fit (Table 1). These models’ struc-
tures, covariance and R2 values are summarized in Table 2 
and Table 3. Political Participation prediction models differ 
between Brazil and Sweden. 
Political Disillusion is predicted by some factors of 
Stereotypes about Parliamentarians. Party-Oriented View 
and Quality of Representation had negative effects in both 
countries (see Table 2). In Sweden two other Stereotypes 
factors entered the model, with positive effects on Political 
Disillusion: Personal Information and Corruption. Education 
Level (assessed as scholarship attainment) had significant 
negative effect on Political Disillusion in Brazil. The posi-
tive effect of Age indicates that older Brazilians are more 
disillusioned than the younger ones. Perceptions over parties 
add relevant evidence. Party Rejection had positive effect on 
Political Disillusion in Brazil, while Party Membership and 
Party Sympathy had negative effect. Party membership had 
negative effect in Sweden. The total of Political Disillusion’s 
explained variance was R2 = 0.33 for Brazil and R2 = 0.46 
for Sweden. 
Pre-Political Engagement (community-driven poli-
tical action, association and volunteering) was mainly 
predicted by Behavioral Contagion, both in Brazil and 
Sweden. Also, women are more prone to Pre-Political 
Engagement than men. Learning about politics from mem-
bers of an association had positive effect on Behavioral 
Contagion. This is the common ground for both countries 
(Table 2). In Brazil, Party Sympathy had a negative effect 
on Pre-Political Engagement. Concerning Stereotypes 
about Parliamentarians, Quality of Representation in 
Brazil and perceived Corruption in Sweden had nega-
tive impact on Pre-Political Engagement. Attention to 
Personal Information had positive effect on Behavioral 
Contagion, producing a mediated effect on Pre-Political 
Engagement. The total of explained variance for Pre-
-Political Engagement in Brazil was R2 = 0.27; and R2 = 
0.23 in Sweden. 
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Table 1. Goodness of Fit indices for Structural Equation Models.
Model χ2 d.f. χ2/d.f. RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI
Political Disillusion
Brazil 388.79 112 3.47 0.050 0.065 0.94 0.93
Sweden 212.34 97 2.19 0.037 0.045 0.98 0.97
Pre-Political 
Engagement
Brazil 334.82 98 3.42 0.050 0.070 0.93 0.92
Sweden 96.51 32 3.02 0.048 0.035 0.97 0.95
Institutional 
Participation
Brazil 746.77 182 4.10 0.056 0.047 0.93 0.91
Sweden 569.56 165 3.45 0.053 .048 0.93 0.92
Political 
Consumerism
Brazil 359.51 87 4.13 0.056 0.073 0.94 0.93
Sweden 225.28 52 4.33 0.062 0.060 0.95 0.94
Street Demonstrations
Brazil 130.27 49 2.66 0.041 0.054 0.97 0.96
Sweden 99.74 34 2.93 0.047 0.038 0.98 0.97
Violence
Brazil 134.53 42 3.20 0.047 0.066 0.96 0.95
Sweden 97.67 48 2.04 0.034 0.037 0.99 0.98
Table 2. Summary of SEM models – predicting Political Participation factors and standalone items (part 01).




Brazil Sweden Brazil Sweden Brazil Sweden
R2 = 0.33 0.46 0.27 0.23 0.83 0.80
Behavioral Contagion … … +0.51 +0.46 +0.91 +0.73
Stereotypes about Parliamentarians
Critical Information (2nd order factor) … … … … +0.56a …
Party-Oriented View -0.29 -0.27 … … … …
Representation Trends … … … … … …
Personal Information … +0.19 +0.25a … … …
Quality of Representation -0.25 -0.22 -0.08* … … -0.16
Corruption … +0.47 … -0.10** … …
Demographics
Political Education … … … … … …
“on your own” +0.39b … … … … +0.30a
“from members of association” … … +0.42a … … …
Age +0.25 … … … … …
Wealth … … … … … …
Education Attainment -0.20 … … … … …
Gender … … ♀ 0.12 ♀ 0.07 … …
Left-Right … … … … … …
Party member -0.08* -0.08* +0.42 +0.43a* … +0.26
Party sympathy -0.10** … -0.12** … … …
Party rejection +0.10** … … … … …
aMediated by Behavioral Contagion. bMediated by Party-Oriented View.
*p < 0.05; **p< 0.01; For all other values, p < 0.001. Non-significant results were removed.
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about Parliamentarians predicted Political Consumerism: 
while Party-Oriented View had positive effect, mediated 
by Behavioral Contagion, Quality of Representation had 
a small negative effect. Education achievement had a 
positive direct effect. Total of variance explained for Po-
litical Consumerism was R2 = 0.16 for Brazil. In Sweden, 
Party-Oriented View and perceived Corruption had direct 
impact on Political Consumerism. Additionally, left-winged 
citizens were more likely to engage Political Consumerism. 
Total of variance explained for Political Consumerism in 
Sweden was R2 = 0.18. 
In Sweden, Behavioral Contagion had the strongest im-
pact on participation in Street Demonstrations and Quality 
of Representation had negative direct impact, i.e., the per-
ception of the bad quality of parliamentarians’ work helps 
to explain the engagement on Street Demonstrations (R2 = 
0.18, see Table 3). In Brazil, similar effects were observed 
for Behavioral Contagion and Quality of Representation. 
However, other variables entered the model. Wealth and Age 
had negative direct effect, i.e., poorer and younger Brazilians 
are more likely to engage on street demonstrations. The total 
of variance explained in Brazil was R2 = 0.19. 
Table 3. Summary of SEM models – predicting Political Participation factors and standalone items (part 02).
Political Consumerism Street Demonstrations Violence
Brazil Sweden Brazil Sweden Brazil Sweden
R2 = 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.12 0.09
Behavioral Contagion +0.34 +0.25 +0.38 +0.40 +0.23 -0.20
Stereotypes about Parliamentarians
Critical Information (2nd order factor) … … … … … …
Party-Oriented View +0.48a +0.11** … … … -0.14
Representation Trends … … … … … …
Personal Information … … … … … +0.15**
Quality of Representation -0.08* … -0.07* -0.13 -0.15 …
Corruption … -0.18 … … … +0.17
Demographics
Political Education … … … … … …
“on your own” … … … … … …
“from members of association” … … … … … …
Age … … -0.17 … -0.21 …
Wealth … … -0.09** … … …
Education Attainment +0.16 … … … … …
Gender ♀ 0.12 ♀ 0.10 … … … …
Left-Right … Left 0.21 … … … …
Party member … … … … … …
Party sympathy … … … … … …
Party rejection … … … … … …
aMediated by Behavioral Contagion. 
*p < 0.05; **p< 0.01; For all other values, p < 0.001. Non-significant results were removed.
In both Brazil and Sweden, Behavioral Contagion plays a 
core role in predicting Institutional Participation (see Table 
3). In Brazil, Behavioral Contagion mediated the effect of Cri-
tical Information (second-order factor from Stereotypes about 
Parliamentarians). In Sweden, the only Stereotype factor that 
entered the model was Quality of Representation, with negative 
effect over Institutional Participation. Still in Sweden, other 
variables had significant prediction power towards Institutional 
Participation: Party Membership had a positive effect – hence, 
being a member of a party helped engaging into institutional 
participation in Sweden. Learning politics alone helped parti-
cipation, however mediated by Behavioral Contagion. 
In both countries, a relevant amount of variance was explai-
ned by the independent variables that entered the model (Brazil: 
R2 = 0.83; Sweden: R2 = 0.80). Regarding the first-order factors 
under Institutional Participation, relevant shares of variance 
were also explained for Attention (Brazil: R2 = 0.87; Sweden: 
R2 = 0.81) and Action (Brazil: R2 = 0.62; Sweden: R2 = 0.66). 
On Political Consumerism, the common ground between 
Brazil and Sweden is that Behavioral Contagion had direct 
positive effect and that women are a little more likely to 
engage in this type of action (Table 3). In Brazil, Stereotypes 
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The perception that Violence is a legitimate kind of political 
action was explained in Brazil by Behavioral Contagion, Age 
(with negative effect) and a negative perception of Quality of 
Representation (Table 3). Total of variance explained for Politi-
cal Violence Legitimacy in Brazil was R2 = 0.12. In Sweden, the 
perception of parliamentarians’ Corruption had positive effect. 
Party-Oriented View had negative direct effect on Political Vio-
lence Legitimacy, while attention to parliamentarians’ Personal 
Information had positive effect. These two Stereotypes factors 
were partially mediated by Behavioral Contagion. Behavioral 
Contagion had positive direct effect on Political Violence Legi-
timacy. Total of variance explained for Sweden was R2= 0.09. 
Discussion
Mean differences provided a more positive scenario for 
Sweden than for Brazil, considering that Swedes show less 
Disillusion and lower support for Violence (see the first part 
of the results section). Brazilians, nonetheless, were more en-
gaged in Institutional Participation and Street Demonstrations, 
possibly as effect of recent mass participation episodes (Ran-
thum, 2013). Further explanation of Political Participation, 
concerning the effect of Stereotypes about Parliamentarians 
and Behavioral Contagion, is presented henceforth.
Critical Information about parliamentarians was a 
second-order factor, composed by Party-Oriented View, 
Representation Trends and Personal Information first-order 
factors. The general Critical Information measure offers an 
evidence of participants’ sensitivity to the parliamentarians’ 
diversity. It is inferred that, if a participant ignores one type of 
information, it is not relevant to him/her to tell the difference 
of one politician to another. Hence, stereotypes supposedly 
work as cues to understand which groups are present at the 
parliament (Jussim et al., 1995; Sacchi et al., 2013). 
Critical Information played a significant role to predict 
Institutional Participation in Brazil (though mediated by 
Behavioral Contagion – Table 3). Nonetheless, there is 
previous evidence that Brazilians cannot easily understand 
their country politics and do not usually know the difference 
among parties and among politicians (Henrique, 2010). In 
Sweden, none of the Critical Information factors helped 
predicting Institutional Participation. Conversely, there is 
previous evidence that Swedes understand the difference 
among parties (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). This counter-
-intuitive finding will be further discussed ahead.
Swedes attentive to Personal Information (Stereotypes ba-
sed on the politicians’ gender and religion) were more likely 
to be disillusioned. In Sweden, both gender and religion are 
currently related to political issues. Feminist activism makes 
its points through intensively contesting activity (Johansson 
& Lilja, 2013). Religion, on its turn, is related to the immi-
gration of Muslims – which is the underlying motivation of 
2013 riots, when the killing of an immigrant triggered violent 
protests (Hansson, Cars, Ekenberg & Danielson, 2013). 
Differently from Sweden, Personal Information in Brazil 
was associated with Pre-Political Engagement, mediated 
by Behavioral Contagion. This might reflect the insertion 
of churches into the political scene and gender-equality 
activism. In Brazil, churches are actively connected to vo-
luntarism. Likewise, feminist and gay-rights activism have 
gained importance on the recent years. These themes are often 
connected, as homosexual and feminist activism antagonize 
with Christian commonly spread beliefs (Natividade, 2010).
In both countries, Political Disillusion decreased as the 
citizen showed a Party-Oriented View. This highlights that 
understanding the party-related differences helps preventing 
citizens falling into hopelessness towards political insti-
tutions. This is supported by results on party preferences. 
Brazilian party-sympathizers and party members are less 
disillusioned. Those who reject parties are more likely to 
feel disillusioned. In Sweden, only party membership had a 
negative effect on Disillusion. 
Party-Oriented View and the second-order Critical Infor-
mation factors had a pro-democratic effect – hence, the ability 
to differentiate politicians based on these criteria produced a 
positive attitude towards politicians. Personal Information, on 
the contrary, was associated with Disillusion and Violence, 
unveiling a negative attitude. In short, criteria for differen-
tiating politicians may reflect how people identify and react 
to opposing groups in society, either seeking institutions, 
avoiding them or supporting violence.
Party-Oriented View had positive effects on Political Con-
sumerism, both in Brazil (mediated by Behavioral Contagion) 
and in Sweden (directly). In Sweden, it was found that left-wing 
participants are more likely to engage Political Consumerism, 
which actually reflects the trend of environmental-friendly 
parties, as they usually oppose big businesses (Green-Pedersen, 
2012; Holmberg & Hedberg, 2009). In Brazil, instead of political 
orientation, the increase of Educational Attainment positively 
predicted Political Consumerism. Therefore, use of consump-
tion choices to pressure businesses seems to be related to the 
scientific knowledge provided by formal education. 
Regarding the second element in Stereotypes about Par-
liamentarians, Behavior Prediction (i.e., how citizens predict 
parliamentarians’ behaviors), Quality of Representation was 
found to be better in Sweden, and Corruption was perceived 
as higher in Brazil. This finding actually supports previous stu-
dies on each country’s political context, as they indicate poor 
trust, high corruption and low perceived efficacy of political 
institutions in Brazil (Cunha, 2006; Moisés & Carneiro, 2008) 
and high trust, low perceived corruption and good efficacy 
of Swedish political institutions (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005; 
Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). It is reasonable to infer that 
Swedes are more satisfied with their democratic institutions 
than Brazilians, which is also supported by the studies above. 
Political Disillusion in Sweden increases as perception 
of Corruption increases and perception of Quality of Repre-
sentation lowers. The same effect was found for Quality of 
Representation in Brazil, but perceived Corruption did not 
help predicting Political Disillusion there. The absence of the 
Corruption factor on the model indicates that Brazilians can 
get Disillusioned or not, regardless how corrupt politicians 
seem to be. This is another counter-intuitive result.
In Sweden, lower perceived Corruption was related to higher 
Political Consumerism and Pre-Political Engagement (Table 2 
and Table 3). In Brazil, the result was the opposite: when politi-
cians are “not doing a good job”, Pre-Political Engagement and 
Political Consumerism increased. For both countries, bad Qua-
lity of Representation is connected to Disillusion. Nevertheless, 
8 Psic.: Teor. e Pesq., Brasília, Vol. 32 n. esp., pp. 1-10
TL Carneiro et al.
Swedish citizens that perceive bad Quality of Representation are 
more likely to engage Institutional Participation. Hence, it is true 
that in Sweden dissatisfied citizens may get more interested in 
politics. Amnå and Ekman (2014) suggest that people get into 
action when they distrust people in power. The same effect was 
observed on Street Demonstrations (where lower Quality of 
Representation increased engagement, see Table 3).
We now examine these counter-intuitive findings. Despite 
corruption being a very important issue on Brazilian politics 
(Bethell, 2008; Cinnanti, 2011), this factor did not enter any of 
the Brazilian prediction models. Nonetheless, Corruption did 
predict participation in Sweden. This requires a careful inter-
pretation. The absence of Corruption in the prediction models 
does not necessarily indicate that all Brazilians are insensitive 
to it – especially considering that Brazilians took the streets 
on Marches against Corruption since 2011 and on June 2013 
protests (Ranthum, 2013). It indicates that some Brazilians react 
to Corruption by engaging in political action, others do not – 
hence, statistics become trendless, and no significant covariance 
is found. Swedes seem to react against corruption on a more 
consistent way. Conversely, Quality of Representation played a 
significant role on predicting participation in Brazil and Sweden. 
This indicates that corruption alone is not enough to explain 
citizens’ dissatisfaction with politicians, but perceiving the low 
Quality of Representation may catalyze action. 
In another counter-intuitive finding, the attention to Critical 
Information (which encompasses Party-Oriented View) had 
significant impact to Institutional Participation in Brazil, not in 
Sweden. It may be deduced that, when it comes to Stereotypes 
about Parliamentarians, what is relevant to one country has 
greater effect on the other. This is intriguing, right?
Stereotypes, just as other cultural artifacts, are systems of 
shared beliefs (Jussim et al., 1995; Mackie, 1973; Ryan, 2003). 
What is commonsense to one country (such as Brazilian cor-
ruption) loses its power to differentiate citizens’ attitudes and 
behaviors. Therefore, in Brazil, where people more difficultly 
understand parliamentarians’ differences (Henrique, 2010; 
Kinzo, 2004; Moisés & Carneiro, 2008), Critical Information 
was relevant to tell the difference between Brazilians who 
engage Institutional Participation and those who do not. In 
Sweden, on the contrary, Corruption becomes relevant to 
predict participation as citizens clearly feel moved to react. 
Cultural differences may explain what becomes com-
monsense to one country or another. Swedes’ Horizontal 
Individualism is probably the ground for their low toleran-
ce on corruption – i.e., parliamentarians are expected to 
respect laws as citizens do, as egalitarianism and solidarity 
are core values (Hofstede, 1980; Realo et al., 2008; Trian-
dis & Gelfand, 1998). Brazilians’ Vertical Collectivism 
(Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) and Power Distance (Hofstede, 
1980) are related to their tolerance to social hierarchy, their 
acceptance of politicians’ (supposed) higher status and 
their distrust in institutions’ capacity to fight corruption 
(Realo et al., 2008). 
Behavioral Contagion had a strong positive effect on 
Political Participation. Wherever this variable entered, it had 
the strongest direct covariance over the target type of Political 
Participation (Table 2 and Table 3). It also had mediating 
effect on Critical Information factors (from Stereotypes about 
Parliamentarians) for Brazilians. 
Behavioral Contagion had a pivotal role for Pre-Political 
Engagement (Table 2). The learning of politics from members 
of an association, labor union or party is mediated by Behavio-
ral Contagion, which emphasizes that the mutual influence is 
fundamental to convert the learned knowledge into action. In 
Brazil, those who avoid mainstream politics and integrate a 
network of influence may mobilize their communities, as they 
do not trust the capacity of politicians to solve their country’s 
problems (Amnå & Ekman, 2014; Stolle et al., 2005). 
Behavioral Contagion was also pivotal for Institutio-
nal Participation. In Brazil, attention to parliamentarians’ 
characteristics (Critical Information) seems to discriminate 
citizens who are prone to engage institution-oriented action. 
As this variable was mediated by Behavioral Contagion, it is 
understood that the network influence is needed to convert the 
knowledge about Parliamentarians into action. In Sweden, 
citizens’ dissatisfaction with Quality of Representation is al-
ready a direct trigger for Institutional Participation. However, 
a greater effect is caused by Behavioral Contagion, as it helps 
converting the learning of politics “on your own” (Table 3) 
into action. In both Brazil and Sweden, Behavioral Contagion 
was important to convert beliefs into action (corroborating 
Cho & Rudolph, 2008; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Le Bon, 
1896; Moscovici, 1985).
Similarly, Behavioral Contagion predicted engagement 
into Street Demonstrations without mediation or covariation 
effects in Brazil and Sweden. It also had the strongest effect 
over Political Violence Legitimation in both countries. These 
results offer support to the strong effect of social influence for 
catalyzing political action (e.g. Cho & Rudolph, 2008; Lake & 
Huckfeldt, 1998; McClurg, 2003; McFarland & Thomas, 2006). 
Generally speaking, political education contexts had very 
little effect on Political Participation. Most loci of political 
learning were excluded from SEM analyses – school, univer-
sity, family, coworkers and friends. Solely two items offered 
mediated effect. The item “[you learned] ... from members 
of an association / trade union / party in which you are a 
member” was found important to Pre-Political Engagement, 
possibly because the context of learning was also the context of 
participation. The item “[you learned] on your own”, was im-
portant to prevent Political Disillusion in Brazil and to predict 
Institutional Participation in Sweden. There is no consensus 
in literature if Education significantly contributes to engaging 
in political action (Berinsky & Lenz, 2011; Kam & Palmer, 
2008; Mayer, 2011). However, there is the possibility that 
education in schools, universities and other loci has effect for 
some students to engage in political action, but not to others, 
then in this case no trend comes out from statistics.
Conclusion
The main contribution of this research was to add evi-
dence to the empirical approach on Political Participation, 
comparing contrasting countries. Brazil and Sweden are so 
different in political culture that this comparison became an 
acid test for this research instruments and objective. 
Structural Equation Models helped to identify how 
Brazilian and Swedish mindsets differ. This study provi-
ded additional evidence that the concept of Stereotypes 
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can be used to understand citizens’ viewpoint over the 
parliamentarians, with relevant usefulness to predict par-
ticipation. This highlights that the understanding of group 
differences is not necessarily attached to prejudice and 
discrimination (corroborating Jussim, et al., 1995; Mackie, 
1973; Ryan, 2003) and, moreover, it is useful to predict the 
participants’ behavior. It was also found that Behavioral 
Contagion played a pivotal role on predicting participation. 
These processes may be similarly found on other cultures; 
therefore, this study can be replicated in other countries by 
translating the questions and making cultural adaptations 
on instruments and methodology.
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